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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has categorically narrowed 
the most severe punishments for youthful offenders convicted of seri­
ous crimes. restricting the punishments for these adolescents including 
the death penalry and life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole (LWOP) for non-homicide crimes. These decisions have mirrored 
the steady. yet uneven. shift within juvenile justice from a punishment 
to rehabilitative paradigm. This continued movement toward rehabili­
tation is necessary because almost all low-level and many serious­
otTending adolescents can be successfully diverted from the juvenile 
and adult criminal justice systems. Of concern, though, is the ongoing 
transfer of adolescents. often direct and without a judicial hearing, 
from the juvenile to the adult courts in many states. and potential for 
lWQP sentences after the Miller v. Alabama Supreme Court decision. 
While the Court now requires individualized judicial sentencing for 
these adolescents, finding that mandatory lWQP state laws are uncon­
stitutional. this sentence will most probably still be the outcome in 
punitively-focused jurisdictions. These lWQP sentences for adolescents 
who have committed a homicide are rarely in the individuals, courts, or 
societies' best interests. 
In making the argument that all juvenile LWQP sentences should 
be unconstitutional - in that a fulure parole hearing should at least 
be an option - this p,lper first reviews the Supreme Court doctrine 
that has minimized categorical sentencing laws for extreme youthful 
offender pu nishments and requirements fo r mitigating evidence 
reviews: second. discusses the state transfer and sentencing laws 
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that will continue to allow a juvenile lWQP sentence for homicide 
post Miller; third, provides a profile of serious youthful offenders 
and a number of thei r most difficult experiences and problems that 
gravely increase the risk of involvement in criminal offending: and 
fourth, advocates for the use of effective preventative programming 
and treatments that improve serious youthful offender outcomes, 
including those who have committed homicide, by addressing these 
difficul ties. Through earlier interventions with very at-risk children 
and adolescents it is possible to divert most from offending and 
harmful behaviors. Even for those that are not diverted and commit 
homicide, the use of life sentences to prison is simply draconian for 
this extinguishes not only any possibility of an offender'S rehabilita­
tion. but also any hope. In addition. the Supreme Court has a long 
history of decisions that find adolescent offenders differem from 
adult offenders and that age itself and its corresponding limitations 
to be mitigating factors. An alternative that allows at least a chance 
for a parole hearing is warranted. This does not guarantee or justify a 
prison release. but would allow an opportunity for adolescents who 
have committed homicide crimes. and are sentenced to die in prison. 
to show the ability to change or rehabilitate. 
2. Supreme Court doctrine 
2. J. Categorical sentencing bans 
The Constitution's Eighth Amendment requires punishment to be 
proportioned to the offense (Raper v. Simmons. 2005, p. 560). A key 
factor in this proportionality determination is the culpability of the 
offender (Arkins v. Virginia. 2002. p. 319: Edmund v. Virginia. 1982, 
pp. 797- 802 ; Raper v. Simmons, 2005, pp. 569- 570). Since 2002, (he 
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Court in Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida (2010), 
and Miller v. Alabama (2012) narrowed the available use of the most 
severe criminal punishments for four categories of offenders, ﬁnding 
these sentences violated the Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish­
ment Clause. 
In the Court's ﬁrst decision, Atkins, it was found that youthful (and 
adult) offenders with lower intellectual functioning could not be 
sentenced to death because their disabilities limited impulse control 
and judgment abilities, “[t]hey do not act with the level of moral culpa­
bility that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.” 
(Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 305). The Court further reasoned that the 
use of this severe punishment neither afforded retribution for the 
offender's act nor deterrence (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 311). This deci­
sion was important in providing serious youthful (and adult) offenders 
with signiﬁcant mental retardation and developmental disabilities 
respite from the death penalty. 
In the second decision, Roper, the Court found youthful offenders 
less culpable for similar impulse control reasons, among others, but 
went further to ﬁnd adolescence itself a mitigating factor (Roper v. 
Simmons, 2005, p. 557).1 This was not the ﬁrst Court holding or 
commentary on juvenile offender culpability, for in Johnson v. Texas 
(1993), the Court stated: “the signature qualities of youth are transient; 
as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may 
dominate in younger years can subside” (p. 368). The Court found 
relevant differences between those under 18 years of age and adults 
so consequential as to not classify adolescents among the worst 
offenders.2 These differences included an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility leading to impetuous actions as well as a lack of maturi­
ty,3 lessened character development,4 and vulnerability to negative 
inﬂuences and outside peer pressure5 (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, p. 557). 
For these reasons “almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of 
age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental con­
sent” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, p. 557). The juvenile death penalty was 
thus abolished, though these individuals were resentenced to LWOP. 
In the third decision, Graham, the Court found that sentencing 
non-homicide youthful offenders to LWOP was unconstitutional. In 
so holding, the Court reinforced and relied upon its Roper decision 
in reiterating that youthful offenders are different from adult 
offenders, and that these characteristics mean that “[i]t is difﬁcult 
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reﬂects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, 
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reﬂects irreparable 
corruption” (Graham v. Florida, 2010, p. 22). The Court further found 
that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” (Graham 
v. Florida, 2010, p. 24). The Court decision, however, did not extend 
this constitutional protection to youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP 
for homicide crimes. 
This constitutional protection from LWOP for youthful offenders 
convicted of homicide was extended in the fourth decision, Miller. 
The Court furthered the reasoning from Roper and, more signiﬁcantly 
from Graham, in  ﬁnding that a youthful offender convicted of 
1 “The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signa­
ture qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.” 
2 “The reality that juveniles still struggle to deﬁne their identity means it is less sup­
portable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of 
irretrievably depraved character.” 
3 “[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in 
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These 
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” 
4 “[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The person­
ality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less ﬁxed.” 
5 “[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a 
person may be most susceptible to inﬂuence and to psychological damage. This is 
explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less 
experience with control, over their own environment.” 
homicide and sentenced by a mandatory state statute to LWOP was 
unconstitutional. The Court determined that these mandatory laws 
“run afoul of our cases' requirement of individualized sentencing for 
defendants facing the most serious penalties” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, 
p. 13). 
2.2. Mitigating evidence 
The Supreme Court has increasingly required the review of youthful 
(and adult) offenders' backgrounds, characteristics, experiences, and 
difﬁculties before allowing some of the more severe judicial sentencing 
punishments. The Court held, in 1972, the death penalty to be unconsti­
tutional due to arbitrary and capricious state sentencing standards 
(Furman v. Georgia, 1972). When the Court reestablished the death 
penalty as constitutional four years later, it directed the sentencing 
authority to consider relevant mitigating circumstances to the offense 
and a range of factors about the individual defendant (Gregg v. 
Georgia, 1976;  Profﬁtt v. Florida, 1976). In striking down mandatory 
capital sentencing statutes that existed prior to 1972, the Court found 
that the ﬂaw was the failure to permit the presentation of mitigating cir­
cumstances (Woodson v. California, 1976). “[T]he Eighth Amendment,” 
explained the Court, “requires consideration of the character and record 
of the individual … as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inﬂicting the penalty of death” (Woodson v. California, 1976,  
p. 303).6 
Beginning with Lockett v. Ohio (1978) the Court recognized that in 
order to support individualized sentencing requirements in capital 
cases the sentencing authority must be permitted to consider any 
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the offense 
circumstances. In Eddings v. Oklahoma the Court accepted the Lockett 
plurality's approach and emphasized that Lockett requires the 
“sentencer to listen” (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 1982, p. 115) and that 
troubled childhood histories must be considered as a mitigating 
factor. Subsequently, the Court found that jury instructions may not 
limit jury consideration of these mitigating circumstances a signiﬁ­
cant step in having all parties be aware of the defendant's background 
and circumstances (Hitchcock v. Dubber, 1987). Also, the Court found 
that the defendant's background and character are relevant because 
of society's belief that a disadvantaged background, emotional difﬁ­
culties, or mental problems may diminish offenders' moral culpability 
(California v. Brown, 1976). Indeed, the Court has posited that “[t]he 
sentence imposed at the death penalty stage should reﬂect a reasoned 
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime” 
(Woodson v. California, 1976, p. 304), and must consider both the 
tangibles and intangibles of the defendant (Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
1987). In some cases, evidence of drug abuse, brain damage, and 
poverty must be reviewed by the sentencing authority (Hitchcock v. 
Dubber, 1987). 
It is unequivocal that evidence from childhood difﬁculties must be 
presented to the sentencing authority (Williams v. Taylor, 2000). The 
Court in Williams determined that the following evidence should be 
considered at sentencing of defendants: child borderline mental 
retardation, child physical abuse, parent imprisonment for child 
neglect, and reuniﬁcation of the child with the abusive parent post 
prison release. In this particular case, the Court faulted the absence 
of jury instructions informing the jury that it could consider and 
give effect to the defendant's mental retardation and history of 
abuse (Williams v. Taylor, 2000, pp. 370–371). 
And most recently in Miller, the Court went further stating that “[m] 
andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
6 The Court continued that “without this consideration, the possibility of compas­
sionate or mitigating factors could not be reviewed in light of the frailties of human­
kind. Fixed death penalty sentencing guidelines treat human beings as members of a 
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind inﬂiction of the penalty of 
death.” 
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chronological age and its hallmark features — among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It 
prevents taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him – and from which he cannot usually extricate himself – 
no matter how brutal or dysfunctional” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012,  p.  15). 
2.3. Juvenile LWOP today 
The law today allows the sentencing of youthful offenders 
convicted of homicide to LWOP, but only after the sentencing court 
has investigated and reviewed the adolescent's mitigating evidence, 
involvement in the offense, and related matters. Speciﬁcally, a sen­
tencing authority must consider the adolescent's age and impact on 
maturity and appreciation of consequences, the adolescent's family 
and home environment, the offense circumstances including involve­
ment level and inﬂuence of peers, the adolescent's level of sophistica­
tion in dealing with the adult criminal justice system, and the 
possibility for rehabilitation. This mitigation investigation should be 
thorough and identify important developmental, family, maltreat­
ment, mental health, and other related disability circumstances that 
the adolescent suffers or has suffered from; and in particular, those 
that impacted the commission of the crime (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). 
The Court went further in stating that they believed that “appropri­
ate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest of penalty will 
be uncommon” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, p. 17). This prognosticated 
outcome may become a reality, but there remain obstacles. There is 
no guarantee that important evidence of an adolescent's family difﬁcul­
ties, mental health problems, learning deﬁciencies, or other mitigating 
evidence has been identiﬁed or addressed prior to or concurrent 
with criminal court involvement. There is signiﬁcant concern for the 
underreporting of family maltreatment and dysfunction within child 
welfare (Administration for Children and Families, 2011), the stigma 
and avoidance of mental health disorder diagnoses and subsequent 
treatment (Kessler et al., 2005; Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, 2008a), the hidden or difﬁcult to identify 
learning and academic disabilities (Leone & Weinberg, 2010), among 
others. If important mitigating evidence is not uncovered and utilized 
within the judicial process, then the right attached in Miller is not 
guaranteed. In addition, it is quite possible that many sentencing 
authorities are not aware of the strong links from these difﬁculties to 
serious youthful offending, and may minimize their importance. 
3. State juvenile LWOP statutes 
A sentence of LWOP for a youthful offender was available in 32 
states prior to the Miller decision. For an adolescent to receive a life­
time imprisonment sentence, there are two steps involved: ﬁrst, the 
adolescent is transferred from juvenile to criminal court jurisdiction; 
and, second, post conviction, a life sentence is ordered. A majority of 
youthful offenders transferred to criminal courts over the past two 
decades have been through statutory exclusion waivers, automatically 
excluding certain youthful offenders from the juvenile courts' original 
jurisdiction, with speciﬁed offense and age criteria — most often older 
adolescents, ages 15 to 17, for homicide, rape, and other serious crimes 
(Green, 2005; Redding, 2010). By 2000, only 13% of adolescents tried in 
the criminal courts had received a judicial transfer hearing, being auto­
matically transferred through these exclusion waivers (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009); little has changed in the transfer laws over the past 
decade (Grifﬁn, 2011). There are, on average since 2001, over 1500 
adolescents who commit a homicide each year in the United States 
(Puzzanchera & Kang, 2011). 
State laws that direct juvenile transfer and LWOP sentences can be 
separated into three categories. The following three tables for each 
category include: the state; speciﬁc state code or statute for both 
the transfer and sentencing laws; age minimum or range by which a 
youthful offender can be transferred from juvenile to criminal court; 
and how a LWOP sentence is handled, be it discretionary, mandatory, 
or different via the type of crime. 
The ﬁrst category includes states that allow a LWOP sentence for a 
homicide to be determined with sentencer discretion, whereby the 
sentencing authority is able to review and hold hearings to consider 
and weigh mitigating and aggravating evidence (see Table 1: Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee). These state laws are 
constitutional after Miller if the sentencing court is required to review 
the adolescents' mitigating evidence and the offense circumstances. 
The second category includes states where the transfer of the 
adolescent to criminal court is discretionary but the LWOP sentence 
is mandatory for a homicide. Thus allowing the possibility of a review 
hearing prior to transferring the adolescent to criminal court, but if 
transferred and convicted, the LWOP sentence automatically applied 
(see Table 2: Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina). These sentencing laws, though not the 
transfer laws, are unconstitutional after Miller. 
Table 1 
LWOP allowed after review of mitigating and aggravating evidence. 
State Statute Law summary 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-701-706; 752; §501(A)–(B) (2012)
 
California Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.05(a-–i); §209 (2011)
 
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. §571-22(d); §706-656(1) (Lexis 2012)
 
Idaho Idaho Code Ann. §18-4004; §20-508; §20-509(3)–(4) (2011)
 
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §2-202, 2-203, 2-304; 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. §3-8A-06 (Lexis 2012) 
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-21; §43-21-151(a), 43-21-157(8) (Lexis 2012) 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §200.030 §62B.330 (2012) 
New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:1-a; §628:1 (2011) 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code §12.1-32-01; §12.1-04-01 (2011) 
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §701.9 (West 2010 and Supp. 2008); 
tit. 10, §7306-1.1 (West 2010) 
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-202, 39-13-204; 
§37-1-134 (a)(1) (Lexis 2012) 
Juvenile transfer (ages 15–17) is mandatory; LWOP is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 16) is discretionary; LWOP is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is discretionary for these same offenses; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder or heinous second-degree murder is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is mandatory for certain offenses; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) for murder is discretionary; 
LWOP is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 13) is mandatory for murder; 
LWOP for murder is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 8) for murder is mandatory; 
LWOP for murder in ﬁrst degree is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 13) is discretionary; 
LWOP for murder in ﬁrst degree is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 14) is discretionary; LWOP is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (age 13) for murder is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is discretionary 
Juvenile transfer (no age limit) for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is discretionary 
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Table 2 
Transfer is discretionary but LWOP is mandatory (sentencing law is now unconstitutional). 
State Statute Law summary 
Alabama Ala. Code §13A-5-39-52; §13A-15-34 (2011) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is discretionary; 
LWOP for murder or for Felony A habitual offender is mandatory 
Arkansas Ark. Code §9-27-318(b)(2009); §5-4-104 (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is discretionary; 
LWOP for capital murder is mandatory 
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. §902.1; §232.45(6)(a) (West 2010) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is discretionary; 
LWOP for Class A Felony is mandatory 
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws §712A.4; §769.1; §791.234(6); §791.244 (2012) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is discretionary; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory 
(though Governor clemency available after 10 years served) 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. §609.106; §260.125 (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is discretionary; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder and other heinous crimes is mandatory 
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. §565.020; §211.071 (West 2011) Juvenile transfer (age 12) is discretionary; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws §12-19.2-4; §14-1-7 §11-23-2; §12-19-11 (2011) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is discretionary; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45; §20-7-7605(6) (2011) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is discretionary; 
LWOP for murder is mandatory only with prior conviction 
The third category includes states where the transfer of the adoles­
cent to criminal court is mandatory and the LWOP sentence was 
mandatory for a homicide, thus not allowing any review hearing either 
at transfer or sentencing (see Table 3: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington). These sentencing laws, 
though not the transfer laws, are also unconstitutional after Miller. 
It is these last two mandatory sentencing state law categories 
(Tables 2 and 3) that are now unconstitutional after the Miller decision. 
The individuals so sentenced are entitled to a sentencing authority 
review, now including mitigating and offense involvement evidence. 
The Supreme Court, in Miller, limited the use of juvenile LWOP 
sentences and asked as part of their analysis if “objective indicia of 
society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state 
practice”, show a national consensus against a sentence for a particular 
class of offenders (Graham v. Florida, 2010, p. 10). Today, 21 states 
(Tables 2 and 3) must statutorily amend their juvenile LWOP sentencing 
laws because of Miller, while 11 state sentencing laws (Table 1) are  
constitutional as written. When recognizing that the Miller decision 
Table 3 
Transfer and LWOP sentence is mandatory (sentencing law is now unconstitutional). 
has required a minority of states (21 of 50) to amend their sentencing 
laws for this population, and that the remaining 18 states do not even 
allow this sentence, LWOP punishment already is in fact unusual. In 
other words, a national consensus has already emerged against this 
most severe punishment for youthful offenders — a life sentence with­
out even the possibility for a parole hearing. 
The importance, prevalence, and impact of serious youthful 
offenders' maltreatment histories, mental health disorders, and learn­
ing disabilities are next reviewed; representing some of the mitigating 
evidence required after (and through earlier Supreme Court decisions, 
before) Miller; evidence that links these difﬁculties to serious offending, 
and, at times, homicide. 
4. Serious youthful offender proﬁle: required mitigating evidence 
Most children and adolescents do not suffer from nor experience 
maltreatment victimizations (or extreme family dysfunction), learning 
disabilities, or mental health problems. If a child or adolescent does 
have one of these difﬁculties, it most often is a singular experience 
State Statute Law summary 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-35b; §46b-127 (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is mandatory; 
LWOP for capital murder is mandatory 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 §4209; Tit. 10 §1010, 1011 (2012) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is mandatory, 
though juvenile can request a hearing; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory 
Florida Fla Stat. Ann. §775.082; §985.225 (2012) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) is mandatory; 
LWOP for murder is mandatory 
Illinois 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-8-1; 405/5-130 (4)(a) (West 2011) Juvenile transfer (age 13) is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory (with one aggravating factor) 
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:30.1; La. Child Code Ann. art. 305 (2011) Juvenile transfer (age 15) for these offenses is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst- and second-degree murder is mandatory 
Massachusetts Mass Gen. Laws ch. 119, 72B; §74; id., ch. 265, §2 (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 14) for these offenses is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst- or second-degree murder is mandatory 
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-247; §28-105; §29-2522 (2011) Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory; 
LWOP for ﬁrst-degree murder is mandatory 
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-17; §7B-2200 (2011) Juvenile transfer (age 13) for Class A felony (murder included) is mandatory; 
LWOP for murder in ﬁrst degree is mandatory 
Pennsylvania 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1102, 9711; Juvenile transfer (no minimum age) for these offenses are mandatory; 
61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §6137; §6355(e) (2011) LWOP for ﬁrst- or second-degree murder is mandatory 
South Dakota S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §22-6-1; §24-15-4; §26-11-3.1 (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 16) is mandatory; 
LWOP for Class A felonies is mandatory 
Texas Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §12.31 (2011) Juvenile transfer (age 17) for capital murder is mandatory; 
LWOP for capital murder is mandatory 
Virginia Va. Code Ann §18.2-10; §16.1-269.1; §53.1-151(B1) (2012) Juvenile transfer (age 14) is mandatory; 
LWOP for murder is mandatory with 3 felony convictions 
for murder, rape, or robbery 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §10.95.030; §13.04.030 (2011) Juvenile transfer (age 15) for serious violent offense is mandatory; 
LWOP for aggravated murder in the ﬁrst degree is mandatory 
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(Mallett, 2003). Only a small percentage (less than one percent) of 
children and adolescents will be a victim of maltreatment, have a learn­
ing disability (three to four percent), be diagnosed with a serious mental 
health disorder (ﬁve to nine percent), or have an active substance abuse 
problem (4 to 5%) (New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, 2003; 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2008a, 
2008b; U.S. Department of Education, 2010; U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2010). However, reviews of detained and incarcer­
ated youthful offenders have found signiﬁcantly higher incidences of 
these experiences within this population — from two (some mental 
health disorders) to as many as 60 times (for maltreatment victimiza­
tion, see Table 4) the rates found in the child and adolescent population 
(Leone & Weinberg, 2010; Mears & Aron, 2003; Teplin et al., 2006; 
Washburn et al., 2008). 
Maltreatment victimization rates are the substantiated cases of 
abuse and neglect as reported by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services; learning disabilities and emotional disturbances 
are the identiﬁed students who are under an individualized education 
plan as directed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2010); and mental health/substance 
abuse disorders are diagnosed psychiatric problems as deﬁned by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). These problems and difﬁcul­
ties are much more common in the serious youthful offender population 
(Table 2, 2nd column). This compares to the adolescent population 
(ages 12 to 17) in the United States, where signiﬁcantly lower rates 
are found across all problem and difﬁculty areas (Table 2, 3rd column). 
The range in prevalence rates for detained and incarcerated youthful 
offenders reﬂects the difference from detention center populations 
(lower rates) to state-run juvenile justice incarceration facilities (higher 
rates). This is noteworthy because many adolescents who commit 
homicide have a serious offending background, often including place­
ment in a state-run juvenile justice incarceration facility (Farrington, 
Loeber, & Berg, 2012; Heide, Roe-Sepowitz, Solomon, & Chan, 2011). 
4.1. Link to delinquency and serious offending 
The small number of adolescents who commit serious offenses 
often have long histories of delinquency beginning at an early age 
and are most at risk to continue offending patterns into adulthood 
(Degue & Widom, 2009; Howell, 2003; Snyder, 1998). As is evident 
from the detained and incarcerated youthful offender population, this 
group is disproportionately impacted by maltreatment and related 
trauma, mental health problems, and learning/academic disabilities. 
These difﬁculties not only are important mitigating evidence that 
should be reviewed by a sentencing authority, but also are often linked 
to the offending and delinquent behaviors. 
Table 4 
Maltreatment and education/mental health problem prevalence rates. 
Type Detained/incarcerated Adolescent 
youthful offender population (%) 
population (%) 
Maltreatment victimization 26–60 1a 
Special education disabilities 28–45 4–6b 
(learning disabilities and 
emotional disturbances) 
Serious mental health disorders 25–70 5–9c 
Substance abuse 30–70 3–5d 
a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2010). 
b Mallett (2011), U.S. Department of Education (2010). 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2008b), U.S. Surgeon 
General (2001). 
d Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2010). 
4.1.1. Maltreatment victimization 
Children and adolescents who have been maltreated are more likely 
to engage in delinquent activities and more serious offending behaviors, 
compared to children and adolescents without a maltreatment history 
(Loeber & Farrington, 2001; Verrecchia, Fetzer, Lemmon, & Austin, 
2010; Yun, Ball, & Lim, 2011). Due to the signiﬁcant differences in 
outcomes of offending acts (e.g., arrest, conviction, delinquency adjudi­
cation), including whether ofﬁcial records or youthful offender self-
reports were used, the link between maltreatment and delinquency 
may be underestimated (Maxﬁeld, Weiler, & Widom, 2000). 
All three maltreatment types (physical abuse, sexual abuse, and 
neglect) have been linked to later antisocial behavior, violent crimes, 
and court involvement (Grogan-Kaylor, Ruffolo, Ortega, & Clarke, 2008; 
Lemmon, 2009; Yun et al., 2011), even in the presence of other risk 
factors (Loeber & Farrington, 2001; Widom & Maxﬁeld, 2001). Research 
is clear that repeated maltreatment, no matter the type, has a key 
impact on youthful offending behavior (Arata, Langhinrichsen-
Rohling, Bowers, & O'Brien, 2007). Such repeat victimization predicts 
the initiation, continuation, and severity of delinquent acts, and is asso­
ciated with serious, chronic, and violent offending behaviors (Hamilton, 
Falshaw, & Browne, 2002; Smith & Thornberry, 1995). 
While ﬁndings are mixed, age of maltreatment onset appears 
related to youthful offending, though both early childhood (before age 
ﬁve) maltreatment (Manly, Kim, Rogosch, & Cicchetti, 2001) as well as 
adolescent age maltreatment (Johnson-Reid & Barth, 2000) have been 
found linked. Further, in two clinical studies of youthful offenders who 
committed homicide, female offenders had higher rates of childhood 
abuse (and mental health problems) than male offenders (Roe-
Sepowitz, 2009); however, in the second study, male and female 
offenders had comparable rates of physical and sexual abuse as children 
(Zagar, Isbell, Busch, & Hughes, 2009). 
4.1.2. Learning disabilities 
Children at risk for academic failure in elementary school often 
have unidentiﬁed learning problems; those who fail are at increased 
risk for later offending behaviors (Hawkins et al., 2000). It is also 
speculated that adolescents with unidentiﬁed learning disabilities 
may be disproportionately represented among those who are 
suspended, expelled, and/or drop out of high school (Keleher, 2000). 
Suspensions, expulsions and dropping out are all risk factors for delin­
quent and criminal activities, often serious offending (Hawkins et al., 
2000; Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, & Palma, 2009). 
Yet even for those adolescents who have been identiﬁed with 
learning disabilities their risk for delinquency is still higher. Reviews 
have found that adolescents with learning disabilities compared to 
those adolescents without such learning disabilities have two to 
three times greater risk of being involved in offending activities, as 
well as higher offending recidivism rates (Matta-Oshima, Huang, 
Jonson-Reid, & Drake, 2010; Wang, Blomberg, & Li, 2005). This link 
from the schools to the juvenile courts, and in particular detention 
and incarceration facilities, has gained the attention and concern of 
many policy makers and stakeholders. This pathway, often called 
the school-to-prison pipeline, may be funneling adolescents with 
learning disabilities in vastly disproportionate numbers into the 
juvenile justice system (Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile 
Justice, 2010). 
4.1.3. Mental health and substance abuse disorders 
Mental health problems and disorders are linked to later youthful 
offending behaviors and delinquency; though it is not clear if this link 
is direct or if these difﬁculties lead to other risk factors, poor decision-
making, or the interaction of various other risks (Grisso, 2008; Shufelt 
& Cocozza, 2006). Still, reviews have consistently found that children 
and adolescents who are involved with mental health services have 
a signiﬁcantly higher risk for later juvenile court involvement 
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(Rosenblatt, Rosenblatt, & Biggs, 2000; Vander-Stoep, Evans, & Taub, 
1997). 
In reviews that investigated the link from speciﬁc childhood 
mental health difﬁculties to juvenile court involvement a number of 
pathways have been established. Developmental studies have found 
behavioral and emotional problems to be predictive of later delin­
quency and substance abuse (Hawkins et al., 2000). Early childhood 
aggressive behaviors have been found predictive of later delinquent 
behaviors and activities, as well as attention and hyperactivity prob­
lems have been found linked to later high-risk taking and more violent 
offending behavior (Grisso, 2008). In addition, childhood depression 
and attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder have been found linked to 
later delinquency, evidenced through physical aggression and stealing 
behaviors (Wasserman et al., 2003). 
For adolescents who are detained or incarcerated, a number of 
pathways from earlier mental health problems have been identiﬁed. 
Adolescent mental health and delinquent populations were found to 
be at higher risk for detention or incarceration with a diagnosis of 
alcohol problems or conduct disorder in middle school, reported use 
and abuse of substances, and being African-American or Hispanic — 
a potential tie-in with the disproportionate minority conﬁnement 
problem (Scott, Snowden, & Libby, 2002). Other reviews have substan­
tiated an increased risk of detainment for drug use and public mental 
health insurance coverage of the adolescents (Brunelle, Brochu, & 
Cousineau, 2000; Wierson, Forehand, & Frame, 1992). These two 
populations, adolescents with mental health problems and those 
involved in the juvenile justice system, often differ little across service 
delivery systems (Teplin et al., 2006). 
4.2. Comorbidity 
There is a strong link from these difﬁculties to serious youthful 
offending, often including detention and incarceration. These adoles­
cent difﬁculties also become more complex and more difﬁcult to unravel 
because of frequent comorbidities. Court-involved adolescents often 
have multiple disabilities and/or disorders occurring both over time 
and at the same time, a situation that may greatly compound the nega­
tive outcomes (Dembo, Wareham, Poythress, Meyers, & Schmeidler, 
2008). The comorbidity conundrum is an under-investigated phenome­
non, but one that may strongly affect serious and chronic offenders, and 
those at risk for LWOP sentencing. 
When such comorbid phenomena have been studied, difﬁcult and 
complicated adolescent and family problems have come to light. In one 
investigation of delinquent youthful offenders, it was found that 32% 
had an identiﬁed special education disability, 39% had an identiﬁed 
mental health disorder, 32% had an active substance abuse problem, 
56% had been victims of maltreatment, and over 40% had two or more 
of these problems; with higher comorbid prevalence rates found for 
those who were detained or incarcerated (Mallett, 2009). In a similar 
review of a jurisdiction's mental health system and juvenile court, 20% 
of adolescents receiving mental health services had a recent arrest 
record, while 30% of adolescents arrested received mental health 
services (Rosenblatt et al., 2000). And in a study of the mental health 
problems of adolescents transferred from the juvenile to the criminal 
courts in Chicago, over 43% of the youthful offenders had two or more 
psychiatric diagnoses (Washburn et al., 2008). 
Of signiﬁcant concern are the adolescents who are seriously emo­
tionally disturbed, identiﬁed with multiple mental health disorders 
and related problems that continue into adulthood. This group almost 
always has contact with the juvenile justice system, represents up to 
20% of youthful offenders within incarceration facilities, and continues 
to have offending problems and eventual involvement with the criminal 
courts (Cocozza & Skowyra, 2000). It is estimated that one of every ten 
adolescents who are seriously emotionally disturbed has both an 
impairing mental health disorder and an active substance abuse 
problem; a dual diagnosis, which is particularly difﬁcult to address in 
treatment (Chassin, 2008). 
These comorbid difﬁculties are also common in youthful offenders 
who have committed homicide. Many of these offenders' backgrounds 
have included combinations of the following: mental health disorders, 
developmental delays, substance abuse, maltreatment, and severe 
family dysfunction (Fenderich, Mackesy-Amiti, Goldstein, Spunt, & 
Brownstein, 1995; Heide, 2003; Heide et al., 2011; Hill-Smith, Hugo, 
Hughes, Fonagy, & Hartman, 2002; Myers & Scott, 1998; Zagar, Busch, 
Grove, & Hughes, 2009). For some of these offenders, these difﬁculties 
were experienced during both childhood and adolescence, compounding 
the problems (Mallett, 2003). 
5. Rehabilitation of serious youthful offenders 
Detained and incarcerated serious youthful offenders struggle 
during the signiﬁcant amounts of time they spend within juvenile 
institutions with the multitudes of difﬁculties that have been under 
discussion, all of which can be correlated with higher risk of recidi­
vism in and out of placement (Rosenblatt et al., 2000). However, 
research over the past two decades has found ways to improve out­
comes. Both institutional and community-based settings can provide 
programs that reduce the risk of serious youthful offending, some­
times by 20 to 30% (Aos, Phipps, Barnoski, & Lieb, 2001; Greenberg, 
2008). Programs that are effective have a number of common compo­
nents: supportive social contexts and authoritative adults, a focus on 
changing problem behaviors, and interventions to improve the 
adolescent's psychosocial maturity (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). For 
most youthful offenders, there are opportunities to address these difﬁ­
culties and disabilities during probation supervision, detention, and in­
carceration. It would be important in working with youthful offenders 
to identify as early as possible the risk and disability areas and to ad­
dress these difﬁculties preventatively. It may be possible to divert 
many adolescents before the commission of a serious felony or homi­
cide, thus triggering automatic transfer laws and the possibility of 
LWOP sentencing; in particular since most serious youthful offenders 
have a signiﬁcant delinquent and offending past, including detention 
and incarceration (Heide, 2003; Howell, 2003; Redding, 2010). 
5.1. Detention reform 
The detention of youthful offenders is best limited to those who 
have committed a serious offense and who pose a clear danger to 
public safety due to a high risk of their reoffending. However, 
detaining and incarcerating youthful offenders in and of itself does 
little to improve delinquent behaviors or offending outcomes, and, 
in certain circumstances, it causes harm by negatively affecting ado­
lescents and increasing their recidivism risk (Loughran et al., 2009; 
Winokur, Smith, Bontrager, & Blankenship, 2008). However, when 
such institutional stays incorporate the identiﬁcation of adolescent 
trauma, disability, and other problem areas, include subsequent reha­
bilitative efforts, and move away from a punitive framework, youthful 
offender outcomes can be signiﬁcantly improved (Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, 2009; Greenberg, 2008). 
It is critically important to identify, as early as possible, a youthful 
offender's disability problems or difﬁculties. A number of screening 
tools and instruments are available and are effective in identifying 
adolescent mental health problems and disorders (Massachusetts 
Youth Screening Instrument, Youth Level of Service/Case Management 
Inventory, Behavioral and Emotional Screen System, Diagnostic Inter­
view Schedule for Children Version 4), substance abuse and disorders 
(Adolescent Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Instrument, Global 
Appraisal of Individual Need — Short Screen, Michigan Alcohol 
Screening Test), and trauma problems (Traumatic Events Screening 
Inventory, Child Welfare Trauma Screening Tool, Trauma Symptom 
Checklist for Children). In fact, studies of the effects stemming from 
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the utilization of one of these mental health screening tools 
(the MAYSI-2) found that in nine detention centers in three states, 
staff increased efforts to obtain mental health services and suicide 
precautions for youth in the facilities (Models for Change, 2011). 
Unfortunately, this is far from the norm in such facilities (Sedlak & 
McPherson, 2010). 
Within the detention and incarceration facilities a number of 
speciﬁc programs and interventions have been found effective — 
aggression replacement training, cognitive–behavioral therapy, and 
the Family Integrated Transitions Program. Aggression replacement 
training uses certain cognitive–behavioral techniques to identify 
anger triggers, improve behavioral skills, and increase youthful 
offenders' pro-social skills; cognitive–behavioral therapy focuses on 
skill building and step by step curriculum to affect change; and the Fam­
ily Integrated Transitions Program uses a combination of interventions 
(Multi-systemic Therapy, relapse prevention, etc.) to address youthful 
offender's mental health and substance abuse problems and to ease 
transitions back to the community after detention facility release (Aos, 
2004; Lipsey & Landenberger, 2006). 
5.2. Incarceration reform 
Serious youthful offenders who are transferred to adult incarcera­
tion facilities have little hope for improved outcomes. Jails and prisons 
are violent and traumatizing places for many inmates, with high levels 
of physical assaults (Stephan & Karberg, 2003; Wolff, Blitz, Shi, Siegel, 
& Bachman,  2007). Difﬁculties encountered while incarcerated may 
impose new learned behaviors on prisoners, increasing antisocial activ­
ities because of the experience (Dodge & Pettit, 2003). 
There is more hope for serious youthful offenders within the juve­
nile justice system, supporting efforts for the juvenile courts to retain 
jurisdictional custody; or at least not without a thorough judicial review 
of what is in the best interests of the adolescent and the community. A 
majority of serious youthful offenders across the nation in the juvenile 
justice system are still in large “training school” type facilities (Livsey, 
Sickmund, & Sladky, 2009). Such facilities generally provide little to 
no rehabilitative care for youthful offenders with disabilities, often do 
not meet the education  – often special education – needs of the adoles­
cents, and can be overcrowded and unsafe environments (Sedlak & 
McPherson, 2010). Many, but not all, incarceration facilities use puni­
tive approaches; however, recognition is growing that a rehabilitative 
approach better achieves important public policy goals of decreasing 
youthful offender recidivism and, subsequently, increasing community 
safety (Caldwell, Vitacco, & Van Rybrock, 2006). 
There is evidence that incarceration facilities that identify serious 
youthful offender problems and provide disability treatment services 
can have a signiﬁcant impact on decreasing reoffending (Armeluis & 
Andreassen, 2007; Garrido & Morales, 2007; Greenwood & Turner, 
2009). Behavior contracting and programming, individual counseling, 
skill building (improving anger management skills, for example), 
group counseling, education, vocational training, and combinations 
of these services have shown some effectiveness as rehabilitative 
interventions. In addition, studies indicate that when such rehabilitative 
interventions are utilized, they must be well designed, of high quality, 
and of sufﬁcient duration in order to have an impact (Lipsey, 2009; 
Weisz, Jensen-Doss, & Hawley, 2006). 
5.3. Serious youthful offenders, homicide, and rehabilitation 
Many serious and violent juvenile offenders can be rehabilitated, 
including those adolescents who commit homicide (Heide et al., 
2011). While the treatment efﬁcacy literature is still not fully developed 
for the subset of serious youthful offenders who commit homicide, 
enough is known to discuss how to rehabilitate two groups. The ﬁrst 
group includes those who are not long-term delinquent offenders and 
their homicide was often an isolated act of violence, with the victim 
being closely inter-related with the offender. Outcomes, when studied 
for this group, are quite positive with most not reoffending post-
prison release and successfully reintegrating with their families and 
communities; hence, rehabilitative efforts may not need to be focused 
on these young people (Benedeck, Cornwell, & Staresina, 1989; 
Hillbrand, Alexander, Young, & Spitz, 1999). However, the second 
group, those who are chronic or seriously delinquent and commit a 
homicide, struggle signiﬁcantly with their post-prison readjustment 
and have high recidivism rates (Loeber et al., 2005; Toupin, 1993; 
Zagar, Busch, et al., 2009; Zagar, Isbell, et al., 2009). 
Efforts are necessary for this second group in redirecting their 
futures away from a life of adult incarceration and possibly life 
sentences without parole. Many of these young people can be effectively 
rehabilitated within institutions which with they are placed (Kinscherff, 
2012; Mendel, 2011). As discussed, changes are being made to deten­
tion, and in particular some juvenile incarceration facilities, to focus on 
treatment and rehabilitation and not solely punishment. These efforts 
should continue, along with minimizing the transfer of offenders to 
adult incarceration facilities (Fagan, 2008) where little rehabilitative 
programming is available and recidivism rates, post release, are very 
high (Pew Center on the States, 2011; Trulson, Haerle, DeLisi, & 
Marquart, 2011). 
When evaluated, treatment and rehabilitation has been found 
effective for many youthful offenders who have committed a homicide. 
In one review, the Texas Youth Commission, Capital Offender Treatment 
Program (2002) utilized many of the earlier discussed institutional 
facility changes in providing treatment to these young people and 
decreasing their reincarceration rate by 43% over a three-year post-
release time period. Speciﬁcally, rehabilitative programming recom­
mended for this youthful offender group includes cognitive behavioral 
programming, trauma interventions, positive peer communities, men­
tal health and substance abuse treatment, transition and reentry efforts, 
intensive and extended aftercare, and specialized educational and voca­
tional programming (Agee, 1995; Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman, & 
Carver, 2010; Mallett, 2013; Mears & Aron, 2003). 
6. Adolescents sentenced to die in prison 
6.1. Cruel and unusual punishment 
Though the law today allows a juvenile LWOP sentence only after 
an individualized sentencing decision ﬁnds the sanction proportional 
given the circumstances of the offense and mitigating factors, there is 
no guarantee that important evidence regarding the adolescent's 
family problems, learning deﬁciencies, mental health disorders, and 
other mitigating evidence is reviewed at trial. In a review of 53 
juvenile offenders convicted of homicide and sentenced to death row 
(before Roper v. Simmons banned capital punishment for those under 
age 18), almost half (26) of the offenders' life histories or difﬁculties 
were not presented at trial, with an additional ﬁve juries that were 
informed only that the offender was a juvenile. In other words, no mit­
igating evidence was presented for a near majority of this death-row 
sentenced population. However, almost all of these adolescents had 
histories of maltreatment and trauma (many with brain damage), suf­
fered from mental health problems, lived in poverty, and had signiﬁcant 
school and academic problems, including developmental disabilities 
(Mallett, 2003). In a second review of 20 executed juveniles, similar 
outcomes were found in that nine had medically documented brain 
damage; however, only two of these adolescents' jury trials were 
presented with this mitigating evidence (American Bar Association, 
2004). These study ﬁndings are disconcerting because while Williams 
requires an individualized sentencing decision including mitigating 
evidence before a LWOP determination, with the Supreme Court requir­
ing mitigating evidence reviews for all death penalty determinations 
since 1976; it seems this right was not guaranteed for these adolescents 
on death row. 
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There are related problems for these adolescent offenders. It has 
been strongly hypothesized that investigated and substantiated cases 
of maltreatment are just the identiﬁed portion of a most underreported 
phenomenon — with some estimates of maltreatment affecting perhaps 
over eight million of this country's children and adolescents, nearly 
ten-fold the ofﬁcial 2010 rate (Finkelhor, Ormrod, Turner, & Hamby, 
2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). In addi­
tion, serious child and adolescent mental health problems, many times 
related to trauma, are often unidentiﬁed, or if known, lack appropriate 
community-based treatment options (Kessler et al., 2005; Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2008a). These expe­
riences, including poor parenting, abuse and neglect, and mental health 
problems (including psychopathic traits), are predictors of adolescent 
violence and, for some, homicide (DeLisi & Walters, 2011; Heide, 
1999; Hill-Smith et al., 2002; Piquero, MacDonald, Dobrin, Daigle, & 
Cullen, 2005). 
6.2. Constitutional but complicated 
While the Supreme Court's decision in Miller was a step forward in 
eliminating mandatory state LWOP sentences, this still allows the 
LWOP sentence after a review of mitigating and offense speciﬁc evi­
dence. In addition, the scores of state laws that automatically transfer 
certain categories of youthful offenders to criminal court must be 
addressed; an LWOP sentence begins with this transfer. This constitu­
tional right granted in Miller may still not be guaranteed if important 
mitigating evidence is not uncovered – which can be quite difﬁcult in 
many circumstances – and reviewed. In light of whom the population 
of serious youthful offenders is in this country's detention and incar­
ceration facilities, this Court decision does not go far enough in at 
least allowing the possibility of a parole hearing for all adolescents 
who are so LWOP sentenced. 
In fact, if the present prognosticates the future, those currently 
serving juvenile LWOP sentences present a compelling argument. In a 
study of 1579 individuals around the country serving these sentences, 
the following was identiﬁed: nearly half (47%) experienced physical 
abuse, including almost 80% of females; 21% were victims of sexual 
abuse, including 77% of females; 40% had been enrolled in special 
education classes; 84% had been suspended or expelled from school, 
including 53% that were not enrolled in school at the time of the 
crime; 32% had been raised in public housing; and almost 20% were 
homeless, living with a friend, in a detention center, or a group home 
prior to incarceration. For this population sentenced to die in prison, 
changes occurred for those imprisoned for more than 30 years: over 
67% completed high school or obtained a GED, and 71% had not been 
disciplined for their most recent three years (Nellis, 2012). 
The law today does not eliminate juvenile LWOP sentences, thus 
allowing adolescents who commit homicide to be incarcerated until 
death. There is no available review of their status, behavior, develop­
ment, maturity, or responsibility changes while incarcerated, not in 
30 years, not in 40 years, not ever. It is impossible to know or accurately 
predict which offenders can be rehabilitated or become potentially 
useful members of society; but for those limited number of individuals 
whereby change is possible, leaving prison is not. For adolescents 
with signiﬁcant maltreatment, trauma, family, mental health, and/or 
learning and academic problems (though more likely a comorbid amal­
gamation of these difﬁculties over time) to receive this sentence is a 
disproportionate and unjust outcome. While the crimes committed 
are serious, or in some cases heinous, who's to say that earlier interven­
tions or preventative programming addressing these maltreatment, 
disability, and academic problems would not have diverted the adoles­
cents' pathway. As reviewed earlier, many serious offending youth, 
including some who have committed homicide, have successfully reha­
bilitated. A just society takes responsibility for its members, particularly 
those so disadvantaged. Allowing the possibility of a parole hearing is a 
small, but important, option that should be available to adolescents who 
commit homicide and are sentenced to juvenile LWOP. More directly, a 
just society determines that a juvenile LWOP sentence is cruel and 
unusual punishment and holds it to be unconstitutional. 
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